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A. Comment: Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.: The Duty to
Warn of Enhanced Injuries in Automobile Accidents
While automobile manufacturers have long been liable for losses
caused by the negligent construction of motor vehicles,1 the imposi-
tion of liability upon manufacturers for the negligent design of auto-
mobiles is a more recent development.2 Negligent design liability
arises in two basic situations. In the first, the manufacturer must
fully compensate victims for their injuries when a design defect of the
vehicle causes an accident in which injuries are incurred.' In the
second, the defective design of the vehicle does not cause the acci-
dent. However, as a result of the defect the victims sustain injuries
which are greater than those normally associated with accidents of
comparable severity involving properly designed vehicles. Where this
occurs liability also attaches to the manufacturer, but he need only
compensate the plaintiff for these additional or "enhanced" injuries.'
Thus, manufacturers are liable not only for all injuries incurred in
accidents induced by negligent design, but also for enhanced injuries
traceable to design defects.
The duty to protect users from enhanced injuries was initially
imposed on the automobile industry by the Eighth Circuit in Larsen
v. General Motors Corp.' In Larsen the plaintiff received head inju-
ries in a front end collision when the steering assembly of his Corvair
was forced through the passenger compartment. The Eighth Circuit,
holding that such accidents were foreseeable, required General Mo-
tors to produce a crashworthy vehicle-one that is designed to protect
passengers from an unreasonable risk of injury.'
I E.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (Car-
dozo, J.).
2 Trends in products liability law as applied to automobile manufacturers are
discussed in Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CAL. L.
REv. 645, 645-50 (1967).
Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954). See also,
Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972).
'The duty to protect passengers from enhanced injuries was initially applied in
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502-03 (8th Cir. 1968). Other courts have
also adopted this rationale. See Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir.
1974); Bremier v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1972); Dyson
v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 502-05. A crashworthy vehicle is synonymous with a vehicle which protects
passengers from an unreasonable risk of injury. Crashworthiness has been defined by
statute as "the protection that a passenger motor vehicle affords its passengers against
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In Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,' the Fourth Circuit was
presented with a factual situation similar to that encountered in
Larsen. The plaintiff in Dreisonstok, a passenger in a Volkswagen
microbus which collided with a telephone pole, contended that her
severe leg injuries were enhanced as a result of the vehicle's defective
design. Interpreting Virginia law, the court utilized the Larsen ration-
ale to determine whether Volkswagenwerk had designed a crashwor-
thy vehicle.8 As authority for the applicability of Larsen, the Fourth
Circuit relied on its previous decision in Spruill v. Boyle-Midway,
Inc.' In that case, a child had died from chemical poisoning after
ingesting a small amount of furniture polish. Liability was imposed
on the manufacturer for failing to warn consumers of the dangers
incident to the use of furniture polish. Because the decision in Spruill
was indicative of the trend in Virginia cases requiring the manufac-
turer to foresee the danger incident to the use of its product,"0 the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that Volkswagenwerk should also foresee
dangers." Thus, the court adopted the Larsen test that automobile
manufacturers should be charged with the duty of protecting users
from an unreasonable risk of enchanced injuries. 2 However, unlike
the Eighth Circuit in Larsen, the Fourth Circuit in Dreisonstok
adopted tangible criteria for clarifying the standard of unreasona-
bleness. 3 To determine whether the risk of injury associated with the
use of Volkswagenwerk's microbus was unreasonable, the court bal-
anced that risk against the purpose and utility of the vehicle.)4
The court recognized that Volkswagenwerk's microbus incorpo-
rated a unique vehicular structure. It was purposely designed to pro-
vide owners with a van-like vehicle characterized by substantial
cargo space and easy maneuverability at a relatively low price." Al-
though a van differs from a standard passenger car, the court recog-
nized that the van design is utilized extensively in the private sector,
personal injury or death as a result of a motor vehicle accident." 15 U.S.C. § 1901(14)
(Supp. II, 1972).
7 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
1 In Dreisonstok the Fourth Circuit assumed that the Larsen doctrine represented
"the trend of the Virginia decisions." Id. at 1070. The court also assumed that the
doctrine was applicable to the facts of Dreisonstok. Id.
308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
I See note 8 supra.
" In Spruill the Fourth Circuit required a manufacturer to anticipate the general
environment in which a product is used. 308 F.2d at 83-84. This rationale was also
adopted in Dreisonstok, 489 F.2d at 1069-70.
12 489 F.2d at 1070-76. This test was established in Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503.
's See text accompanying notes 14-30 infra.
, 489 F.2d 1066, 1073 (4th Cir. 1974).
'5 Id. at 1073-74.
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particularly by large trucking firms."6 The usefulness of the design
coupled with its widespread acceptance increased the value of the
microbus. Thus, in balancing the various factors, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that the risk of injury was justified by the vehicle's in-
creased value, and was not unreasonable per se. 17 The Fourth Circuit
reached this conclusion, because it did not wish to impose a standard
on the automobile industry which would force elimination of all van-
like vehicles. 8
Although the court did not find that the microbus presented a risk
that was unreasonable per se, the court did reason that a risk of injury
which could be eliminated without placing a heavy economic burden
on the manufacturer and without altering the microbus' design would
be impermissible. The means chosen by the court to identify these
unreasonable risks involved comparisons between the microbus and
similar vehicles of other manufacturers. 9 If these comparisons
showed that the safety standards incorporated in the microbus were
inferior to the other models, Volkswagenwerk would be negligent for
failing to design a crashworthy vehicle. 0
Support for this reasoning was drawn from the decision of a fed-
eral district court in Dyson v. General Motors Corp." In that case,
the court reasoned that the unique design of a convertible presented
a greater risk of injury than did that of a conventional passenger car.
However, the court would not find the risk unreasonable per se,2
conceivably because convertibles had been widely accepted by the
public.n The risk of injury incident to the use of one particular model
of automobile would be unreasonable only if this risk were greater
18 Id. at 1074.
'7 Id. at 1073. Although the Fourth Circuit placed considerable emphasis on the
widespread acceptance of van-like vehicles to justify their inherent dangers, the court
presumably did not intimate that such acceptance is necessary before a risk of injury
is decreed reasonable. If this were the case, it would seem impossible to introduce new
vehicular designs on the market. The Fourth Circuit did not wish to place a "straight-
jacket" on automobile design. Id. at 1075.
I If a risk of injury in a vehicle were unreasonable per se, the manufacturer would
have to remove that vehicle from the market. The court reasoned that this would place
an undue burden on the automobile manufacturer. Id.
11 Id. at 1075-76.
2 Id. at 1074-76. See n.30 infra.
21 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
2 Id. at 1073-74.
2 In referring to a convertible, the Dyson court was creating a hypothetical situa-
tion. Presumably, the increased risk of injury incident to the use of a convertible could
be justified by the vehicle's widespread acceptance, just as the acceptance of the
microbus justified the increased risk of injury incident to that vehicle. See note 17
supra.
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than that occasioned in similar models. 4
The Fourth Circuit found further justification for comparing simi-
larly designed vehicles to determine if one of them presents an unrea-
sonable risk of injury by analogy to standards set forth in the Na-
tional Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.- Under this
legislation the Secretary of Commerce issues safety standards applic-
able to all vehicles. However, these standards vary in accordance with
the purpose and utility of the different vehicles and, therefore, regula-
tions applicable to the conventional passenger car are not necessar-
ily applicable to the microbus.2 1 In essence, the Fourth Circuit recog-
nized that the regulations imposed under the Traffic and Motor Vehi-
cle Safety Act were based on the premise that dissimilar vehicles may
present different risks of injury, and that the increased risk of injury
incident to a particular design may be justified by the unique purpose
and utility of the vehicle. 7
Although the Fourth Circuit found that the unique vehicular
structure of the microbus did not present a per se unreasonable risk
of injury, an opposite result would have been reached if the plaintiff
had proven the existence of an unreasonable risk.3 However, the
plaintiff failed to satisfy this burden, and the court cited evidence
presented by the defendant which had depicted the microbus as
"equal to or superior to that of other vehicles of like type."" In hold-
ing that Volkswagenwerk was not liable for the design of its vehicle,
the Fourth Circuit delineated the parameters of the duty initially
imposed in Larsen. Whereas the Eighth Circuit in Larsen determined
that a vehicle must protect passengers from an unreasonable risk of
24 298 F. Supp. at 1073-74.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act].
15 U.S.C. § 1392 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
(f) In prescribing standards under this section, the Secretary shall-
(3) consider whether any such proposed standard is rea-
sonable, practicable and appropriate for the particular type
of motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment for
which it is prescribed ....
489 F.2d at 1073-75.
21 Id. at 1071.
" Id. at 1075. The evidence which the defendant presented involved comparisons
among the microbus, a Chevrolet van, and a Dodge van. Volkswagenwerk conducted
tests which consisted of crashing each vehicle into a rigid steel pole. In these tests the
"crashworthiness" of the microbus compared favorably to the other vehicles. Brief for
Appellant at 22-24, Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir.
1974).
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injury, the Fourth Circuit in Dreisonstok utilized standards of safety
established by the automobile trade to determine whether a risk is
unreasonable, thereby further defining the Larsen test. 0
The approach adopted by the Fourth Circuit provided effective
standards for determining whether the alleged enchanced injuries
were caused by a design defect in the microbus rather than by a
permissible but unique design feature. Because the microbus was
reasonably designed, liability was not imposed on the manufacturer.
Nevertheless, the unique features of the microbus do present inherent
dangers which could cause injuries not normally associated with acci-
dents in conventional passenger cars. The vehicle's short collapse
distance-that space between the front of the automobile and the
passenger compartment-has been tersely criticized as a potential
hazard.' Moreover, multipurpose vehicles, a classification which in-
cludes the microbus, are exempt from various federal safety stan-
dards applicable to passenger cars.
32
By placing emphasis on the comparison of the microbus to similarly designed
vehicles, the Fourth Circuit relied on standards set by the automobile trade. However,
this type of reliance is subject to valid criticism. As plaintiffs alleged, "[e]ven
uniquely designed vehicles must exercise ordinary care to protect passengers from
unreasonable risks of injury, and they cannot take refuge in the fact that other vehicles
are equally deficient." Petition for Rehearing for Appellee at 17, Dreisonstok v. Volk-
swagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974). Although Dreisonstok utilizes stan-
dards of safety set by the automobile trade, the case does not necessarily stand for the
proposition that these standards are final and exempt from judicial review. See East-
ern Transp. Co. v. Northern Barge Corp. (The T.J. Hooper), 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932); accord, Texaco, Inc. v. Lirette, 410 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir.
1969); Eaton v. Long Island R.R., 398 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1968).
3, Regarding the safety of van-like vehicles, Consumer's Union stated:
Safety experts know that in a front-end crash-by far the most com-
mon type of auto accident and one of the most dangerous types-the
only way to protect occupants from serious injury or death is to keep
them restrained with a rigid compartment and allow a less-rigid for-
ward structure of some sort to collapse and absorb the force of the
crash. In front-end collapse space, these buses leave much to be de-
sired.
36 CONSUMER REPOmRS 493, 494 (1971). See note 32 infra.
32 The Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act authorizes the Secretary of Com-
merce to issue federal safety standards applicable to motor vehicles. 15 U.S.C. §
1392(a) (1970). An analysis of the scope of the regulations issued under the Act reveals
that van-like vehicles are often exempt from coverage. For example, Standard 204
concerns steering control rearward displacement. 49 C.F.R. § 571.204 (1973). The
stated purpose of the regulation is to limit "the rearward displacement of the steering
control into the passenger compartment to reduce the likelihood of chest, neck, or head
injury." Id. Volkswagenwerk's micorbus, a multipurpose vehicle, is exempt from this
regulation. Id. The unique design of the vehicle probably accounts for this statutory
exemption. However, this constitutes an additional justification for imposing the duty
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The likelihood of enhanced injuries due to the permissible design
features of van-like vehicles raises the question of whether there is a
viable means of providing additional protection for the public and yet
preserving the unique design of these vehicles. The test adopted in
Dreisonstok offers no such means because, by balancing the risk of
injury against the purpose and utility of vehicles, the court has im-
plied that preservation of a unique vehicular design is irreconcilable
with additional protection for consumers. However, the Spruill deci-
sion, which the Dreisonstok court relied upon for the proposition that
manufacturers must foresee dangers incident to the use of their prod-
uct, intimates that the duty to warn may provide such a means.3
This duty could obviate some of the limitations of the Fourth Cir-
cuit's analysis in Dreisonstok. Consumers could be provided with
information relating to the possibility of enhanced injuries due to a
unique vehicular design, yet manufacturers would retain the freedom
to produce these vehicles.
In Spruill the Fourth Circuit imposed liability for the manufac-
turer's failure to warn, because furniture polish was deemed an inher-
ently dangerous product and the manufacturer was able to foresee the
dangers incident to its use. However, inherently dangerous products
are not restricted to poisons .3 This classification extends to any prod-
on manufacturers to warn of enhanced injuries. For a discussion of the legal basis of
the duty to warn of enhanced injuries, see text accompanying notes 38-45 infra.
The duty to warn is articulated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965),
stating:
§ 388 Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use. One who
supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use
is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use
the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its
probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the
manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the
supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is
likely to be dangerous for the use for which it supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the
chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its
dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to
be dangerous.
31 Justice Cardozo, speaking for the New York Court of Appeals, reasoned:
We hold then, that the principle. . . is not limited to poisons, explo-
sives, and things of like nature, to things which in their normal opera-
tions are implements of destruction. If the nature of such a thing is
such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when
negligently made, it is then a thing of danger.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916). Justice
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uct when the "danger of injury stems from the product itself, and not
from any defect in it."" Although not defectively produced, the de-
fendant's furniture polish met this test because one or more of its
necessary ingredients was potentially deadly.
Before the duty to warn of these inherent dangers was imposed,
however, it was necessary for the manufacturer to foresee the possibil-
ity of injury incident to the use of the product. The court in Spruill
maintained that a manufacturer must anticipate the general environ-
ment in which his product is used. 6 This duty requires that a manu-
facturer foresee not only the dangers incident to the proper use of an
article but also those incident to its foreseeable misuse. Liability was
imposed on the manufacturer in Spruill because, although he was
able to foresee the possibility that a child might swallow furniture
polish, an adequate warning had not been given.
3
1
Dreisonstok is amenable to the same type of legal analysis. All
automobiles can be classified as inherently dangerous, because the
risk of injury stems from the nature of the product itself." Moreover,
the shortened collapse distance of the microbus presents additional
safety problems which could lead to enhanced injuries in an acci-
dent.3 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's determination that the micro-
bus was not defectively designed becomes unimportant, because the
duty to warn of enhanced injuries is premised upon the existence of
inherent dangers in a vehicle and not merely upon whether a vehicle
incorporates a design defect."
Cardozo was explicitly referring to an automobile in MacPherson. However, his reason-
ing has been expanded and accepted in all areas of products liability law. See, e.g.,
Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 887 (1951).
11 General Bronze Corp. v. Kostopulos, 203 Va. 66, 70, 122 S.E.2d 548, 551 (1961).
Under this test various products have been termed inherently dangerous. See, e.g.,
Elkins v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 700 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd, 429 F.2d 297 (4th
Cir. 1970) (high pressure tire); McClanahan v. California Spray-Chemical Corp., 194
Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712 (1953) (insecticide).
308 F.2d at 83-84.
" Id. at 87.
Motor vehicle deaths numbered 54,688 in 1970, 54,700 in 1971, 56,910 in 1972,
and 56,056 in 1973. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TRAFmc SAFETY '73: A REPORT OF AcwvrriEs
UNDER THE HIGHWAY SAFETY Acr OF 1966, at A8 (1973). These statistics clearly indicate
that automobiles are inherently dangerous. See note 40 infra.
" See notes 31-32 supra.
,0 In Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961), the court, referring
to the design and location of the gas tank in a vehicle, determined "that a jury could
reasonably have found that the American Ford Company was negligent in marketing
a product which was inherently dangerous, of which danger it should have been aware
from its long experience in the design and manufacture of automobiles, and that
American Ford failed to exercise reasonable care to inform the buying public of this
1975]
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The use of the microbus also presents reasonably foreseeable risks
of injury. The pervasiveness of traffic accidents mandates that all
manufacturers should anticipate as a foreseeable misuse that their
vehicles may be involved in accidents.4 Once this initial forseeability
is established, the logical implication is that manufacturers should
also be required to anticipate the possibility of enhanced injuries
resulting from these accidents. Thus, through analogy to SpfuilU, the
legal basis of the duty to warn appears fully applicable to the factual
situation in Dreisonstok. A microbus is inherently dangerous, and
Volkswagenwerk could have foreseen the possibility of enhanced inju-
ries incident to the misuse of that vehicle. If the duty had been
applied, Volkswagenwerk could have been required to provide con-
sumers with information relating to the possibility of enhanced inju-
ries due to the unique vehicular structure of the microbus.
While the courts have not previously imposed this particular duty
on automobile manufacturers, Congress has recognized the import-
ance of providing consumers with information concerning their vehi-
cles.2 The Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act directs the Secretary
of Commerce to issue standards which require manufacturers to pro-
vide purchasers with information regarding the performance of their
vehicles." Although these regulations represent the initial step in
requiring manufacturers to warn consumers of the inherent dangers
of their vehicles, they do not approximate a duty to warn." This
dangerous condition." Id. at 744. See also Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d
497 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1974). See note 33 supra.
"See note 38 supra. The duty to anticipate the misuse of a product or the likeli-
hood of accidents has been widely accepted. Various decisions which have required
manufacturers to protect passengers from enhanced injuries have cited Spruill v.
Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962), as precedent for charging automobile
manufacturers with the duty of foreseeing the possibility of accidents. See, e.g., Tur-
cotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 181 (1st Cir. 1974); Larsen v. General Motors
Corp, 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
" See note 58 infra.
43 15 U.S.C. § 1401(d) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
The Secretary is authorized to require the manufacturer to give such
notification of such performance and technical data as the Secretary
determines necessary...
(1) to each prospective purchaser of a motor vehicle ....
4 49 C.F.R. §§ 575.1 et seq. (1973). The regulations outline the vehicle informa-
tion which manufacturers must provide for consumers. The required items include
information concerning vehicle stopping distance, tire reserve load, truck-camper load-
ing, and acceleration and passing ability. However, these requirements are not applica-
ble to multipurpose vehicles and buses. Even if such requirements were applicable,
they would provide very little information concerning the inherent dangers of van-like
vehicles.
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inadequacy could be remedied by a court imposed duty."5
While the application of this duty will increase the manufac-
turer's responsibility for protecting consumers, the former's interests
will continue to be adequately protected, for recovery may be denied
even where there has been an improper warning. Before damages can
be awarded, a plaintiff must satisfy the difficult proof of enhanced
injuries.46 Even if this proof has been met, recovery will be barred if
the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury.47
The theory of assumption of the risk is the primary defense avail-
able to manufacturers in duty to warn cases, and is one of the primary
reasons for judicial hesitance in applying the laws of negligence to the
41 The Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act does not supplant any common law
liabilities. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1970).
" It has been contended that the proof and measurement of enhanced injuries
presents insurmountable difficulties for the judicial system. Even with the help of
expert testimony, it is very difficult to apportion injuries into two categories: (1)
injuries attributed solely to the accident; and (2) enhanced injuries caused by the
design defect or unique design of the vehicle. See Hoenig & Goetz, A Rational Ap-
proach to "Crashworthy" Automobiles: The Need For Judicial Responsibility, 6 Sw.
U.L. REv. 1 (1974).
However, courts are often confronted with difficult requirements of proof, and the
proof of enhanced injuries can also be handled adequately by the judicial system.
Although the apportionment of injuries involves difficult concepts, this problem should
not cause rejection of the Larsen test and its progeny. See Note, Torts-Strict Liabil-
ity-Automobile Manufacturer's Liability for Second Collision Injuries, 41 TENN. L.
Rxv. 383 (1974).
,1 If the duty to warn had been applied to Dreisonstok, Volkswagenwerk would
have had the burden of proving an assumption of the risk. See, e.g., Elkins v. United
States, 307 F. Supp. 700 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd, 429 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1970).
It has been contended that the defense of assumption of the risk is inapplicable
in a duty to warn case. See Dillard & Hart, Products Liability: Directions for Use and
the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. Rav. 145 (1955). Allegedly the manufacturer would not
be liable if an injured party were warned of the dangers of a product by an indepen-
ent source, because the manufacturer's failure to warn would not be the proxmiate
cause of the injury. Id. at 163. This rationale rejects the contention that the injured
plaintiff assumed the risk of injury.
Stating the issue in terms of proximate cause rather than assumption of the risk,
however, involves merely a difference in terminology. In Elkins v. United States, 307
F. Supp. 700 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd, 429 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1970), the federal govern-
ment sold high pressure tires without providing information as to the proper disman-
tling procedures to be followed. Though injured while attempting to dismantle the
tires, the plaintiffs were denied recovery because they knew of the dangers and "chose
to accept the risk and proceed without further precautions. They took the risk and lost
. ." Id. at 706. Although the court used this assumption of the risk terminology in
its analysis, it stated that the Government's failure to warn was not the proximate
cause of the injury. Id. at 707. The same approach can be utilized in Dreisonstok, as
the factual considerations will remain the same whether the problem is analyzed under
the theory of proximate cause or assumption of the risk.
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automobile industry.5 A tendency exists to assume that all automo-
bile users are aware of the risks incident to motor vehicle travel.
However, such an awareness indicates merely that consumers recog-
nize the prevalence of automobile accidents and assume the risk of
such collisions.49 It does not reveal whether consumers comprehend
the risk of enhanced injury due to a vehicle's unique but compromis-
ing design." For example, in applying the duty to warn in Dreisonstok
Volkswagenwerk would not be liable if the plaintiff were aware of
these risks and subsequently disregarded them.
Although the Fourth Circuit did not directly confront this issue,
it did state that the shortened collapse distance of the microbus was
"readily discernible to anyone using the vehicle."'5 Despite this seem-
ingly pertinent statement, a proper resolution of the assumption of
the risk issue can be made only from an analysis of the plaintiff's
awareness."2 Recognition of the existence of a shortened collapse dist-
ance does not automatically presuppose recognition of the possible
consequences incident to a front end collision. Similarly, it cannot be
presupposed that microbus users realize that that their vehicles could
enhance injuries in an accident, because they lack certain safety
features which are required in other passenger cars.5 3
Through its use of such terms as "readily discernible," the Fourth
Circuit appears to have ignored the distinction between observation
and awareness, thus reaching the untenable conclusion that visual
perception of an injury-enhancing feature invariably results in cog-
nizance of the risk. It is more likely that mere observation of a feature
does not always result in an assumption of the risk. However, if a
potential plaintiff is aware of the possibility of enhanced injuries, he
has necessarily assumed the risk.
The Restatement of Torts4 acknowledges this distinction between
" See note 2 supra.
" See note 38 supra. Several courts have held that automobile users necessarily
realize that they may be involved in accidents resulting in severe injuries. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Prater, 206 Va. 693, 146 S.E.2d 179 (1966); Richter v. Seawell, 183 Va. 379,
32 S.E.2d 62 (1944). Cf. Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.) cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
-' To determine whether a plaintiff has assumed the risk of enhanced injury, the
court must focus on the individual's awareness of the dangers which inhere in the use
of a product. See, e.g., Noto v. Pico Peak Corp., 469 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1972); Spruill
v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962); Elkins v. United States, 307 F.
Supp. 700 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd, 429 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1970).
" Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1074 (4th Cir. 1974).
" See cases cited in note 50 supra.
3 See notes 31-32 supra.
11 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
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recognition of a particular characteristic of a product and cognizance
of the possible dangers inherent in that characteristic:
[T]he condition, although readily observable, may be one
which only persons of special experience would realize to be
dangerous. In such case, if the supplier, having such special
experience, knows that the condition involves danger and has
no reason to believe that those who use it will have such special
experience as will enable them to perceive the danger, he is
required to inform them of the risk of which he himself knows
and which he has no reason to suppose that they will realize."
Thus, the Fourth Circuit's statement that the shortened collapse
distance was "readily discernible" should not be interpreted to mean
that the plaintiff assumed the risk of enhanced injuries. This conclu-
sion would be inappropriate, because the Fourth Circuit failed to
resolve adequately the assumption of the risk issue. Since this addi-
tional information was not provided, it would be impossible to deter-
mine whether recovery would be barred by this defense. However, an
assumption that all users of a microbus are aware of the particular
dangers of that vehicle would be an oversimplification.
Although an analysis of the standards developed in Larsen and
Spruill justifies the application of the duty to warn in factual situa-
tions similar to Dreisonstok, the courts will not impose that duty
unless it is supported by strong policy considerations.57 The underly-
ing rationale of the duty to warn is not to bring the automobile indus-
try to its knees, but rather to keep the public informed as fully as
possible about a product which is an integral part of our society. 8
"Id. comment (k).
5, On a petition for rehearing, the plaintiffs cogently summarized this point:
[Tihe car involved in this case had an apparently heavy steel bumper
in front of it, and a steel protective covering in the front. The inade-
quacies of these to protect are in no way apparent, and there is no
evidence that the injured plaintiff, a 15 year old girl, either did, or
could have, recognized that the negligently designed front of the car
would not provide her reasonable protection.
Petition for Rehearing for Appellee at 13, Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G. 489
F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
3,See generally W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTs § 1 (4th ed. 1971); Winfield, The
Foundation of Liability in Tort, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1927).
The duty to warn of dangers which inhere in the use of certain other products
has been legislatively mandated by the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
2051 et seq. (Supp. II, 1972), The stated purpose of the Act is "to protect the public
against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products." Id. §
2051(b) (1). One method adopted to help implement this purpose requires manufactur-
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Through passage of the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, Con-
gress has already recognized the importance of protecting automobile
passengers.59 However, because this legislation does not fully estab-
lish the duty to warn,60 courts should impose a stricter duty on the
industry in order to keep consumers informed.
Once the decision has been made to impose the duty to warn,
attention must focus on the form which that warning should take.
The Fourth Circuit has stated that it must be "of a character reason-
ably calculated to bring home to the reasonably prudent person the
ers to provide consumers with information relating to the use and performance of their
products:
(a) The Commission may by rule .. .promulgate consumer
product safety standards. A consumer product safety standard shall
consist of one or more of any of the following types of requirements:
(1) Requirements as to performance, composition,
contents, design, construction, finish, or packaging of a con-
sumer product.
(2) Requirements that a consumer product be marked
with or accompanied by clear and adequate warnings or
instructions or requirements respecting the form of warnings
or instructions.
Any requirement of such a standard shall be reasonably necessary to
prevent or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury associated with such
product.
Id. § 2056. A perusal of the regulations, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1 et seq. (1974), indicates
that manufacturers must provide consumers with a significant amount of information
concerning their products, including information relating to any inherent dangers.
However, the automobile is specifically excluded from regulation by the Consumer
Product Safety Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1) (C) (Supp. II, 1972). Although the Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act imposes similar standards for automobiles, these require
manufacturers to provide users with far less information than regulations imposed
under the Consumer Product Safety Act. See notes 43-44 supra. The disparity is not
easily justified, and it should be remedied by imposing a common law duty on automo-
bile manufacturers to warn of dangers inherent in a particular type of vehicle.
"' The need for safer automobiles has been recognized by Congress. A Senate
report preceding the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contended:
[Tlhe committee met with disturbing evidence of the automobile
industry's chronic subordination of safe design to promotional styling,
and of an overriding stress on power, acceleration, speed, and 'ride'
to the relative neglect of safe performance or collision protection. The
committee cannot judge the truth of the conviction that 'safety
doesn't sell,' but it is a conviction widely held in industry which has
plainly resulted in the inadequate allocation of resources to safety
engineering.
1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2710. The Eighth Circuit in Larsen cited the Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act with approval, illustrating its recognition that consum-
ers need safe performance and collision protection in their automobiles. 391 F.2d at
506.
" See notes 43-44 supra.
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nature and extent of the danger .. . ."" A manufacturer need not
supply the user of a vehicle with a plethora of technical data, because
such information is only meaningful to the expert. Similarly, a manu-
facturer need not warn that automobiles may be involved in acci-
dents, because that is common knowledge. However, automobile
manufacturers should provide users with all pertinent and under-
standable safety information relevant to the use or the foreseeable
misuse of their vehicles.2 This will not place an undue burden on the
automobile industry, because the duty to warn will allow continued
production of speciality vehicles while concurrently providing a
meaningful way to inform the public of the possibility of enhanced
injuries.
J.J.S.
B. Suits in Implied Contract and the Statute of Limita-
tions-Maynard v. General Electric Co., 486 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1973).
The plaintiff in Maynard v. General Electric Co.' was an em-
ployee of O.K. Transfer Company. On February 11, 1968, he was
severely injured by an allegedly defective shipping crate which fell
from the forklift he was operating. The crate had been designed and
manufactured by the defendant, General Electric, for a third party,
and O.K. Transfer had been employed by both parties to deliver the
merchandise from the defendant's plant. On November 9, 1960, more
than two and a half years after the injury, Maynard instituted a civil
action in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of West Virginia, 2 alleging that the defendant was liable under theo-
" Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 85 (4th Cir. 1962).
4 Formulating the duty to warn is easier than defining the standards of that duty.
The central issue that will confront manufacturers concerns the degree of warning that
will be necessary to avoid liability. Although this degree may not be succinctly defined,
manufacturers unsure of their duty will inevitably give an ample warning. Such warn-
ing will further the knowledge of the buying public, satisfying the underlying rationale
of the duty to warn. For a discussion of the capability of the courts to adjudicate the
duty to warn, see Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1558-65 (1973).
'486 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1973).
2 Maynard v. General Electric Co., 350 F. Supp. 949 (S.D. W.Va. 1972) (applying
West Virginia law). The action was originally instituted in the Southern District of
New York but was transferred to the Southern District of West Virginia. Both parties
agreed that West Virginia law governed with respect to the questions of liability and
the applicable statutes of limitation. Id. at 951.
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ries of express and implied warranty.3 The defendant moved for sum-
mary judgment, which was granted by the district court on the
ground that the plaintiff lacked privity of contract with the defendant
and, therefore, the suit was not maintainable.'
On appeal, the plaintiff again asserted that General Electric was
liable for the breach of an implied warranty. Maynard contended
that O.K. Transfer Company was the bailee of the defendant and
that General Electric impliedly warranted that the shipping crate
was safe for its intended purpose of transporting the goods contained
within it.' By claiming that his employer was a bailee, the plaintiff
contended that he thereby avoided any privity question under the
Uniform Commercial Code.7 Further, the plaintiff argued that by
grounding his action on a theory of implied contract, he avoided West
Virginia's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury. The
court of appeals, however, was not receptive to either of the plaintiff's
contentions. In fact, the court completely avoided the privity issue
and decided the case strictly on the issue of the applicable statute of
limitations.
The court found that the sole question on appeal was "what stat-
ute of limitations governs a cause of action for personal injuries when
the action is based on a breach of implied warranty."' In other words,
the court had to decide whether the action was ex delicto, in which
3The plaintiff originally alleged liability under four theories: (1) negligence; (2)
strict liability in tort; (3) express warranty; and (4) implied warranty. In both the
district court and the court of appeals, however, the plaintiff conceded that the first
two causes of action were barred by West Virginia's two-year statute of limitations
applicable to personal injuries. 486 F.2d at 539.
'The district court relied on § 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted
by West Virginia:
§46-2-318. Third party beneficiaries of warranties express or implied.
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest
in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use,
consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation
of the section.
W.VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-318 (1966).
-See note 3 supra. The plaintiff did not pursue his express warranty theory on
appeal. 486 F.2d at 541.
'Although this theory of privity was not specifically argued in the district court,
the court of appeals found that the elements of the relationship appeared in the
pleadings and, therefore, allowed the theory for the first time on appeal. Id. at 539.
'See note 4 supra, for the West Virginia privity requirement. It is difficult to assess
the merits of the plaintiff's privity argument since the Fourth Circuit gave it such short
shrift.
'486 F.2d at 540.
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case the two-year statute of limitations9 would apply, or was ex
contractu, such that the plaintiff would have five years within which
to bring suit.1° The Court held that the action sounded in tort and
was thus barred because the statutory two years had expired. Citing
two early West Virginia cases," the court determined that the stan-
dard to be used was whether the gravamen of the action concerned
property rights or purely personal rights. If the substance of the ac-
tion was damage to property rights, then the contract statute of limi-
tations was applicable. However, since the action was, in essence, one
for personal injury, the court held that the tort statute of limitations
prevailed, regardless of the fact that the suit was brought under a
theory of breach of implied contract. As the court noted, "[t]he
limitation is not determined by the form of action, but by its ob-
ject.""
The plaintiff in Maynard relied on Howard v. United Fuel Gas
Co.," a West Virginia pre-Code case. In Howard, the plaintiff was
injured in 1963 as the result of an explosion of a gas pipe that was
negligently installed by the defendant between 1953 and 1955. In
1965, the plaintiff brought an action for damages on the theories of
negligence and breach of implied warranty of fitness. The district
court in Howard held that where an action was ex delicto, the statute
of limitations did not begin to run until the time of the injury (i.e.,
1963)," whereas in an action ex contractu, the period of limitations
'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2-12 (1966) provides in relevant part:
Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed
shall be brought ... within two years next after the right to bring the
same shall have accrued if it be- for damages for personal injuries
low. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2-6 (1966) provides in relevant part:
Every action to recover money, which is founded upon an award, or
on any contract other than a judgment or recognizance, shall be
brought within the following number of years: . . .if it be upon any
... contract, express or implied, within five years ....
"Although the court in Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34 W.Va. 252, 12 S.E. 519 (1890)
mentioned that the gist of the action was important in determining the appropriate
statute of limitations, the thrust of the case centered on whether the plaintiff's
amended pleadings stated a new cause of action not presented in the original plead-
ings, and whether the statute of limitations began to run from the date of the original
pleadings or from the date of the amendment.
In Jones v. Jones, 133 W. Va. 306, 58 S.E.2d 857 (1949), the court stated that ".
periods vary according to the nature of the right of action . . ." and distinguished
between property rights and purely personal rights. The court did not, however, divide
its designation of actions into separate classes of tort and contract. 133 W.Va. at 308,
58 S.E.2d at 858.
12486 F.2d at 540, citing Birmingham v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 98 Va.
548, 551, 37 S.E. 17, 21 (1900).
"1248 F. Supp. 527 (S.D. W.Va. 1965) (applying West Virginia law).
"Id. at 529. The court stated:
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began to run at the time of installation (i.e., between 1953 and 1955),
when the implied warranty of fitness is deemed to have been
breached. 15 However, the Maynard court recognized that the district
court's holding in Howard provided no assistance because it did not
set any standard for determining whether the action for personal
injury based on the breach of an implied warranty was one in tort or
contract. It simply provided guidelines as to the running of the limi-
tations statutes once it had been determined that the action was in
either tort or contract.
Without any precedent, therefore, the court of appeals apparently
made a policy decision. In holding that an action for personal injury
which resulted from the breach of an implied contract was a tort
action and was thus restricted by the corresponding statute of limita-
tions, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit must have per-
ceived a certain unfairness in reaching a conclusion that the contract
statute was applicable to such an action. Such inequity is apparent
in the fact situation that arose in Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co. '6 The defendant, Pittsburgh Plate Glass, had manufactured, sold,
and installed plate glass doors in a building in 1958. The plaintiff was
injured in 1965 while walking through the doors, allegedly because of
a defect in them. Plaintiff brought suit in 1969 under the theories of
negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of warranty. The New
York Court of Appeals held ". . . that strict liability in tort and
implied warranty in the absence of privity are merely different ways
of describing the very same cause of action.' '1 7 Thus, the court held
that both actions were barred by the warranty (i.e., contract) statute
of limitations of six years. In effect, the plaintiff's cause of action for
personal injury resulting from the breach of an implied warranty was
[W]e must hold that plaintiff's right of action did not accrue until
the gas explosion in 1963 and that it is, therefore, not barred by the
statute of limitations. This holding is predicated upon the general rule
that a statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the injury,
because it is only then that the aggrieved party has a right of action.
Id.
"Id. at 532. The court stated:
Therefore, we can only hold that in an action ex contractu, where
there is an implied warranty of fitness, the warranty is breached at
the time of the delivery, or as here, at the time the alleged faulty gas
pipes were installed, and that a right of action accrued then and not
when such breach was discoverable. . . as is the rule in certain actions
sounding in tort.
Id.
"625 N.Y.2d 340, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 253 N.E.2d 207 (1969).
"7Id. at 345, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494, 253 N.E.2d at 210.
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barred before it ever even arose.'" Such a result effectively denied
plaintiff his "day in court," and it is commendable, therefore, that
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the tort statute of
limitations was applicable in the instant case.
It should be noted that the criticism'9 that has been leveled at the
Fourth Circuit for not applying the four-year statute of limitations as
provided by § 2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code2 is wholly
unwarranted. That section applies only to a breach of a contract for
sale. "'Contract for sale' includes either a present sale of goods or a
contract to sell goods at a future time. A 'sale' consists in the passing
of title from the seller to the buyer for a price .. ."I' As pointed out
by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Kelly v. Ford Motor Co.,12
a contract for sale contemplates a buyer-seller relationship. The court
in Kelly cited International Union of Operating Engineers Local 57
v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,2' the facts of which are very similar to
Maynard with regard to a third party, who was not a party to the
contract, bringing suit against the manufacturer of a defective prod-
uct.
In Chrysler the plaintiff-union had purchased a car from a local
dealer for the use of its business agent, John A. White, also a plaintiff.
White was injured in 1966 because of a defectively manufactured
"In attempting to justify its holding, the court stated:
We are willing to sacrifice the small percentage of meritorious claims
that might arise after the statutory period has run in order to prevent
the many unfounded suits that would be brought and sustained
against manufacturers ad infinitum. Surely an injury resulting from
a defective product many years after it has been manufactured, pre-
sumptively at least, is due to operation and maintenance. It is our
opinion that to guard against the unfounded actions that would be
brought many years after a product is manufactured, we must make
that presumption conclusive by holding the contract Statute of Limi-
tations applicable to the instant action and limit appellants to their
action in negligence.
Id. at 346, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495, 253 N.E.2d at 210.
"Editor's Note, 13 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 471 (1974):
The court apparently assumes that, if the two-year statute of limita-
tions for personal injury actions were not applicable, the controlling
statute would be W.Va. Code, Art 2, § 6, a five-year statute of limita-
tions "for breach of an implied contract." This is incorrect. An action
for breach of warranty, express or implied, is governed by U.C.C. § 2-
725, which provides a four-year limitations period.
2Section 2-725 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE provides in relevant part:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced
within four years after the cause of action has accrued.
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-106(1).
2110 R.I. 83, 290 A.2d 607 (1972).
2106 R.I. 248, 258 A.2d 271 (1969).
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throttle control cable. More than two years later, White brought suit
against the defendant, Chrysler Motors, under the theory of breach
of warranty. In determining whether the four-year statute of limita-
tions under § 2-725 or the two-year personal injury state statute was
applicable, the court found that Chrysler was not a seller, nor was
White a buyer within the meaning of § 2-725 and § 2-106. Thus,
plaintiff's action was barred by the two-year personal injury statute.
Similarly, in Maynard, General Electric was in no way a seller with
regard to the plaintiff, nor was plaintiff a buyer from the defendant.
Therefore, regardless of whether privity of contract existed, § 2-725
was clearly not applicable, since the only possible contractual rela-
tionship between the parties was one of bailment, not one for the sale
of goods.
The Fourth Circuit, unaided by West Virginia precedent, was
certainly in line with the majority of the courts that have considered
the question of the applicable statute of limitations where personal
injury resulted from the breach of an implied warranty arising out of
contracts other than for the sale of goods.24 The Fourth Circuit's
decision reflects an effort, on the one hand, to protect the consumer
from loss when the defects of a negligently manufactured product do
not cause injury until after the statutory limitation within which to
bring a contract action has expired and, on the other hand, to shield
the manufacturer from personal injury actions that have become
stale. The compromise reached by the Maynard court seems far more




A. Warehouse Receipts Evidencing Sales of Scotch Whiskey in
Casks Included Within Definition of "Security" Necessitating
Registration Under § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933-SEC v.
Haffenden-Rimar International, Inc., 496 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1974).
Section 5(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 requires that a registra-
tion statement be in effect prior to the sale of any security.' Critical
'Barfield v. United States Rubber Co., 234 So. 2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970);
Cartwright v. Chrysler Corp., 255 La. 598, 232 So. 2d 285 (1970); Caudill v. Wise
Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969). See Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 703 (1954).
15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1970). Exemptions from the requirement of a filed registra-
tion statement are provided in Securities Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d.
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to finding a violation of this section is the determination that the sale
in question involved a "security" as defined by the 1933 Act. Section
2(1) of that Act defines security to include, among other things, an
"investment contract."'2 In SEC v. Haffenden-Rimar International,
Inc.,3 the Fourth Circuit considered whether the sale of stored casks
of whiskey was an investment contract and thus came within the
definition of a security.4
The defendant's activities involved selling casks of Scotch whis-
key which were in storage in Scotland.' Purchasers were attracted by
a sales promotion scheme which characterized the whiskey offer as
an investment opportunity with high average capital gains and full
insurance. The incidents of an actual purchase of goods with a view
to trading in or consuming those goods were lacking.6 The purchasers
were not advised what commercial transactions in the casked whiskey
were available to them and were to rely solely on the defendant to
select, cask, warehouse, and repurchase or arrange for the resale of
the whiskey.
7
The district court had granted the SEC a permanent injunction
against the sale of the whiskey on the grounds that such sales would
be in violation of the registration provisions of § 5 of the 1933 Act and
the anti-fraud provisions of both that Act and the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act.' On appeal the facts were stipulated, and the only
issue was whether the sales were of a commodity and thus not of
securities or whether the sales were of investment contracts and
therefore of securities subject to the provisions of the Acts
In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's
2 Id. § 77(b)(1). The same definition is given in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 3(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1970).
3 496 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1974), af'g 362 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Va. 1973).
Id. at 1193.
5Id.
' Although the purchase of whiskey in Haffenden was of tangible goods, it was
unlike a commodity purchase in that it involved small- amounts in specific lots, not
fungible, over which the owners had no control, and in which trading would not have
been feasible. The only possible contrary indication was an instrument characterized
by defendant as a warehouse receipt and by plaintiffs as a letter of acknowledgement.
The purchasers' inexperience with the commodity, their lack of information on how
to trade in their property, and their long distance from its location further indicated
that no commodity trading was possible. 362 F. Supp. at 324-27. See Bloomenthal,
SEC Aspects of Oil and Gas Financing, 7 Wyo. L.J. 49, 56 (1952), citing SEC v. W. J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-300 (1946); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.
344, 348-49 (1943).
362 F. Supp. at 324-27.
'Id. at 327.
496 F.2d at 1193.
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directives that the securities laws should be "construed... flexibly
to effectuate [their] remedial purposes" 10 and that the commerical
character given to an instrument is important in determining
whether or not it is an investment contract." On the basis of these
principles, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's injunction
and adopted its memorandum opinion."
The district court analysis, which was adopted by the Fourth
Circuit, was based upon SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,"3 in
which the Supreme Court stated that the definition of security in-
cluded novel devices if the terms of the offer could be characterized
as an investment offer. 4 Criteria for this determination are the char-
acter given to the instrument by the terms of the offer, the plan of
distribution, and the economic inducements offered. 5 In addition,
the circuit court referred to SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,"6 in which the
Supreme Court described an investment contract as "a contract,
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a com-
mon enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of
the promoters.'
7
Applying the criteria from Joiner and Howey, both courts found
that the terms of the offer and the inducements to potential purchas-
ers indicated that operating funds were being furnished for a common
enterprise in which the promoters' efforts and expertise alone oper-
ated to produce the anticipated return. That aspect of the Howey
definition which stated that profits were to accrue "solely" from the
promoters' efforts presented no difficulty 8 since according to the stip-
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
" 496 F.2d at 1193, citing SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-
53 (1943).
12 496 F.2d at 1193.
13 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
11 Id. at 351; cf. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1126-28 (4th Cir.
1970).
15 SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943). See notes 6 &
7 and accompanying text supra.
" 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
'7, Id. at 301. This case was noted by the Haffenden district court in 326 F. Supp.
at 327; the district court opinion was adopted by the Fourth Circuit in 496 F.2d at 1193.
" Recently, in an attempt to extend the deterrent force of the securities acts to
the pyramid franchise, the courts have dispensed with the overrestrictive application
of the "solely" criterion, finding sales of such franchises to be sales of investment
contracts. While the actual operation of the franchises is in the hands of the purchas-
ers, the high profit promise of such schemes is based primarily, but not solely, upon
the sellers' activities. See SEC v. Koskot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th
Cir. 1974); Nash & Associates v. Lum's, Inc., 484 F.2d 392, 395 (6th Cir. 1973); SEC
v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482-83 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973).
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ulated facts, purchasers participated in no phase of the operation
after the original purchase order. The court thus concluded that the
defendant could not offer or sell the casks of whiskey without compli-
ance with the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.
In its opinion the Fourth Circuit cited a recent decision of the
Second Circuit, Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, which
also held that offers and sales of casks of whiskey were offers and sales
of investment contracts." Apparently neither circuit encountered dif-
ficulty in applying existing standards to the facts in either case, per-
h'aps indicating that there will be no further controversy over whether
such schemes are subject to SEC regulation.
L.D.S.
B. Unorthodox Transactions and Liability for Short-Swing
Profits. Under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934-Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 43
U.S.L.W. 3212 (Oct. 15, 1974).
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' was designed
"to protect the interests of the public against the predatory opera-
tions of directors, officers, and principal stockholders of corporations
by preventing them from speculating in the stock of the corporations
in which they owe a fiduciary duty."' That section imposes liability
for profits realized from the purchase and sale, or sale and purchase,
or a security within a six month period by insiders,3 who under the
Act are officers, directors, and beneficial holders of more than ten
percent of the shares of the corporation issuing the security. 4 An
action to recover such "short-swing" profits from statutory "insiders"
may be brought by the corporation or by its shareholders. 5
Little difficulty has arisen in the application of § 16(b) to tradi-
tional purchase and sale transactions. When the sole issue is whether
1' 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974). This opinion contains a brief outline of past
litigation in the area of whiskey deals. Id. at 1035 & n.7.
21 Id. at 1034. See also SEC v. M. A. Lundy Associates, 362 F. Supp. 226 (D.R.I.
1973), noted in 25 MERCm L. REv. 733 (1974).
15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1970).
2 S. REP. No. 1445, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970), See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 591-95 (1972), for the rationale and history of § 16(b).
Securities Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
Id. § 78p(b).
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a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, by an insider have occurred
within a six month period, the courts have applied the statute strictly
and have held insiders liable regardless of their legitimate intentions
or non-use of inside information.8 But the application of the section
is much more difficult and uncertain when "unorthodox"' methods
of transfer such as mergers, recapitalizations, and conversions are
involved, and in these cases courts have questioned whether strict
application of the section would further its purposes.' In their reluct-
ance to apply § 16(b) automatically to such unorthodox transactions,
courts have developed a less rigid analysis which emphasizes the
voluntariness9 of particular transactions and the opportunity thereby
presented for exploitation of inside information.'" This type of analy-
sis has been characterized as "pragmatic.""
The pragmatic approach was accepted by the Supreme Court in
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.'" In that case
the Court considered whether a statutory insider was liable for short-
swing profits when the closing transaction of the six month period was
a merger.' 3 To determine whether the merger constituted a sale for §
16(b) purposes, the Court scrutinized the merger transaction to deter-
mine whether it afforded a possibility of abuse of inside information
to the defendant, who was a statutory insider before the merger. The
Court determined that the transaction was not under the defendant's
control and was not accompanied by an opportunity for abuse. Since
6 See, e.g., Park & Tilford Inc. v. Schulte 160 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 761 (1947); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
7 2 L. Loss, SECuRrr Ts REGULATION 1069 (2d ed. 1961).
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593-94
(1972). See also Comment, Stock Exchanges Pursuant to Corporate Consolidation: A
Section 16(b) "Purchase or Sale?" 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1034 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as 117 U. PA. L. Rzv.].
Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954).
, Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1036 (1970).
" See Note, Securities Exchange Act Section 16(b): Fourth Circuit Harvests Some
Kernels of Gold, 42 FOR)HAM L. REv. 852 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 42 FowAm L.
Rv.]; Note, Insider Liability for Short-Swing Profits: The Substance and Function
of the PragmaticApproach, 72 MICH. L. Rav. 592 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 72 MIcH.
L. REv.]; Note, Securities Regulation: Section 16(b) "Purchase" and "Sale"--An
Objective or Subjective Approach, 26 U. FLA. L. Rav. 373 (1974); 117 U. PA. L. Rv.
1034. These articles give a thorough review of the development of the pragmatic ap-
proach.
12 411 U.S. 582 (1972). See also R. Lang & M. Katz, Section 16(b) and "Extraordi-
nary" Transactions: Corporate Reorganizations and Stock Options, 49 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 705, 705-12 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Lang]; 42 FoRDHAm L. REv. at 869-70.
,1 411 U.S. 584-90.
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it believed that the application of § 16(b) sanctions in that context
would not further the purposes of the provision, the Court refused to
impose liability."
While the question in Kern was specifically whether a merger was
a sale for the purposes of § 16(b), the pragmatic approach has been
deemed by lower courts to be equally applicable to determinations of
whether unorthodox transactions are purchases within the meaning
of the provision. 5 In Gold v. Sloan'" the Fourth Circuit recently, ap-
plied the pragmatic approach to resolve a case posing the latter dues-
tion.
In Gold, two defendants, Sloan and Scurlock, were long-standing
statutory insiders of Atlantic Research Corporation (ARC). Each
owned more than ten percent of ARC's shares, and each held a seat
on the board of directors, although Scurlock was an outside director.
In December, 1967, a merger of ARC with the Susquehanna Corpora-
" Id. at 584, 595-600.
*' See Lang at 705-57.
Two recent cases which questioned whether defendants who became statutory
insiders by reason of initial purchases of more than ten per cent of the shares of
corporations were liable for profits after subsequent sales within six mbn.ths reached
contrary conclusions, although both courts cited Kern as the basis for their holdings.
See Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost McKessQn, Inc., No. 71-2965 (9th Cir. Sept. 19,
1974) (reported in CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,811) (initial acquisition was not consid-
ered equivalent to § 16(b) purchase); Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & W. Indus.,
Inc., 372 F. Supp. 570 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (similar acquisition was held to be § 16(b)
purchase).
In a petition for certiorari in Champion Home Builders v. Jeffress, 490 F.2d 611
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. _, 94 S.Ct. 2390 (1974), an owner who had sold
out his wholly-owned corporation unsuccessfully attempted to invoke the Kern prag-
matic approach to escape § 16(b) liability. Jeffreds v. Kramer, petition for cert. filed,
42 U.S.L.W. 3615 (U.S. April 4, 1974) (No. 73-1479) (reported in 248 SECumTIEs REGU-
LATION & LAw REPORT A-6 (April 17, 1974)). In that case the owner agreed on one date
to a merger and closed the merger on a later date. His liability for short-swing profits
realized upon a subsequent sale was contingent upon the court's acceptance of the
merger closing date as the date of purchase. The Sixth Circuit questioned only the
timing of the purchase, set that time at the closing date of the merger, and held the
defendant liable for short-swing profits. 440 F.2d at 614-19. The owner argued in the
petition for certiorari that under the pragmatic test of Kern the purchase had taken
place when the agreement to merge was reached, since from that date he had full
opportunity to exploit his insider information. 248 SEcuRrriEs REGULATMON & LAw
REPoir A-6, 7. If the pragmatic argument had been accepted, the date of contract
would have become the date of purchase, the owner's holding time would have been
longer than six months, and he would have excaped liability. It would have been ironic
if the very argument which would have supported his liability under a test of whether
the merger was equivalent to a § 16(b) purchase could have effected his escape from
liability in this case.
" 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), rehearing denied, 491 F.2d 729 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3212 (Oct. 15, 1974).
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tion, which had previously been approved by a close vote of the ARC
directors, became effective after a vote of the stockholders. Within six
weeks after the merger, both Sloan and Scurlock sold part of the
Susquehanna stock they had received as a result of the merger.Y7
Gold, a Susquehanna stockholder, claimed that these sales violated
§ 16(b), 18 and the district court found in her favor as to both defen-
dants. 9
Their substantial shareholdings and status as directors of Susque-
hanna clearly placed Sloan and Scurlock in the § 16(b) statutory
insider category." The sole issue before the Fourth Circuit was thus
whether the merger by which they became insiders of Susquehanna
was a purchase for purposes of § 16(b). The court applied the prag-
matic analysis of Kern, scruitinizing the merger transaction to find
what opportunity the defendants had for exploiting inside informa-
tion.
2'
On the basis that Scurlock's position in ARC did not give him the
power to exploit the merger to his benefit, the Fourth Circuit held
him not liable for his short-swing profits. 2  The court, however,
viewed Sloan's transactions differently. As its chief executive officer,
Sloan had a comprehensive knowledge of ARC. He was in charge of
all merger negotiations with Susquehanna and had full opportunity
to exploit the merger. Therefore the court deemed his receipt of Sus-
quehanna stock in the merger to be a purchase under § 16(b) and held
him liable for short-swing profits.? The essence of the decision was
that Sloan was held liable and Scurlock was held not liabile on the
basis of their respective premerger activities.24 The Gold majority
thus held that the question of whether an opening merger was to be
equated with a purchase, triggering § 16(b) sanctions, should be re-
1 486 F.2d at 342-46.
" Id. at 342. Gold requested the corporation to initiate the suit. When the corpora-
tion failed to act within sixty days, she brought action in her own name and on behalf
of the corporation pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P. 23.1 and § 16(b). Gold v. Scurlock, 290
F. Supp. 926, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The case was transferred to the Eastern District of
Virginia. Id. at 929; Gold v. Scurlock, 324 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Va. 1971).
1" 324 F. Supp. at 1215.
20 486 F.2d at 349, 357. Two toher defendants who were in lower echelons of
management and not privy to the merger negotiations were held not liable by the
Fourth Circuit. Id. at 351.
21 Id. at 344.
2 Id. at 346-51.
2 Id. at 351-53. According to the district court, Sloan's liability also included
interest. The Fourth Circuit disagreed on the grounds that Sloan's violation had not
been willful and that the unavoidable length of proceedings would make interest
charges inequitable. Id. at 353.
24 Id. at 346, 352.
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solved by determining whether the defendant had an opportunity to
exploit the merger transaction during the period ending with the
merger.
Judge Winter concurred with the majority in finding Sloan liable
under § 16(b) but strongly dissented from the result as to Scurlock.
He reasoned that because Scurlock had the potential for abuse after
the merger he should be held liable as a statutory insider of Susque-
hanna.25 While Judge Winter considered premerger activities relevant
in cases such as Kern which involved the question of whether a
merger was a closing transaction of a short-swing period, he found a
clear distinction in cases which involved the question of whether a
merger was an opening transaction.28 He pointed out that the premer-
ger possibilities for abuse by Sloan and Scurlock, scrutinized by the
majority following Kern, were actually possibilities for abuse against
ARC and its stockholders, not against Susquehanna. If the defen-
dants had purchased ARC stock within six months prior to the
merger and had profited by the merger, the question would have been
similar to that in Kern. The defendants' possible liability to ARC
could then have been appropriately tested by an examination of the
defendants' premerger opportunity for abuse.27 The dissent con-
tended, however, that in a case involving a merger as an opening
transaction, a proper application of the Kern pragmatic test would
necessitate an examination of the possibility of a defendant's abuse
of his insider position resulting from the merger. 8
Two potential consequences of the majority's application of Kern
reflect doubt upon its validity. First, if the Kern pragmatic test is
applied to resolve the question of whether a merger was a purchase,
as the majority did in Gold, a loophole may remain for a class of cases
which are ostensibly covered by present statutes.28 Further, under
21 Id. at 356-58.
28 Id. at 353-54. See also Lang at 718, 740-41; Note, Securities-Section
16(b)-Merger as a "Purchase," 20 WAYNE L. Rrv. 1415, 1417-21 (1974).
27 486 F.2d at 355. In any premerger sale of ARC securities based on privileged
knowledge of the upcoming merger, neither Sloan nor Scurlock could have been held
liable to ARC under § 16(b) since they were long-term owners of their respective shares
of ARC. This, however, would not preclude imposition of liability under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
' 486 F.2d at 357. But cf. Lang at 718-19.
" 486 F.2d at 356; 42 FORDHAM L. REV. at 876. An illustration will make readily
apparent the nature of this loophole: consider, for example, S, a long-term holder of
11% of the stock in X corporation and therefore a statutory insider of X. S is, however,
an outsider with respect to corporate transactions. A merger with Y corporation is
effected, and S exchanges his 11% share in X for 5% of Y and is immediately elected
as a director, thus becoming a statutory insider of Y. S then sells his Y stock at a profit
five months after the merger. Although S may have had full opportunity to exploit his
1975]
570 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXII
either the majority or dissenting view in Gold, the possibility exists
that the legislative intent to deter speculation by corporate insiders
may be vitiated by a pragmatic application which apparently offers
hope to the insider that he may escape § 16(b) liability."
The Fourth Circuit's application of Kern was questioned from
another standpoint by Judge Haynesworth in his dissent from a de-
nial of a petition for rehearing in Gold.1 He suggested that Kern
should be read narrowly to hold only that a merger is not a sale for a
person who had no opportunity to exploit the transaction. He also
expressed the opinion that mergers should not be viewed generally as
§ 16(b) liability-invoking transactions. His rationale was that an insi-
der who benefits from a merger does so only proportionately with
every other stockholder. Judge Haynesworth maintained that such a
person normally has no way to exploit the merger to his individual
advantage and thus should not be subjected to § 16(b) liability. In
addition, a different sanction is available since questionable activi-
ties may be appropriately dealt with under anti-fraud provisions of
the 1934 Act.
32
Given these criticisms, it is apparent that some clarification of the
application of the Kern pragmatic test in cases involving mergers as
purchases or sales for purposes of § 16(b) is desirable. Whether or not
the pragmatic approach itself is open to revision, certainly a more
effective enunciation of standards of application is needed.3
L.D.S.
insider position in Y for short-swing profits and thus arguably was acting in a manner
meant to be prohibited by § 16(b), he may escape liability under the Gold interpreta-
tion of Kern because he had no opportunity for abuse of the merger transaction itself.
See Lang at 719-20, 726-29.
411 U.S. at 612-14 (Douglas, J., dissenting); 72 MICH. L. REv. at 612-14.
11 491 F.2d at 730.
3 Id. at 730-31 & n.2. See note 27 supra.
See 72 MICH. L. REV. at 626-27.
